| | 禁使: |
人主之所以禁使者，賞罰也。賞隨功，罰隨罪，故論功察罪，不可不審也。夫賞高罰下，而上無必知其道也，與無道同也。凡知道者，勢數也。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
The method by which a ruler of men prohibits and encourages is by means of rewards and penalties. Rewards follow merit and penalties follow crime; therefore is it necessary to be careful in appraising merit and in investigating crime. Now, rewards exalt and punishments debase, but if the superiors have no definite knowledge of their method, it is no better than if they had no method at all. But the method for right knowledge is power and figures. |
| | 禁使: |
故先王不恃其強，而恃其勢；不恃其信，而恃其數。今夫飛蓬，遇飄風而行千里，乘風之勢也。探淵者知千仞之深，縣繩之數也。故託其勢者，雖遠必至；守其數者，雖深必得。今夫幽夜，山陵之大，而離婁不見；清朝日撽，則上別飛鳥，下察秋毫。故目之見也，託日之勢也。得勢之至，不參官而潔，陳數而物當。今恃多官眾吏，官立丞監。夫置丞立監者，且以禁人之為利也；而丞監亦欲為利，則以何相禁？故恃丞監而治者，僅存之治也。通數者不然，別其勢，難其道。故曰：「其勢難匿者，雖跖不為非焉。」故先王貴勢。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
Therefore, the early kings did not rely on their strength but on their power (shi); they did not rely on their belief but on their figures. Now, for example, a floating seed of the p'eng plant, meeting a whirlwind, may be carried a thousand li, because it rides on the power (shi) of the wind. If, in measuring an abyss, you know that it is a thousand fathoms deep, it is owing to the figures which you find by dropping a string. So by depending on the power (shi) of a thing, you will reach a point, however distant it may be, and by keeping the proper figures, you will find out the depth, however deep it may be. Now, for example, in the darkness of the night, even a Li Lou cannot see a great mountain forest, but in the clear morning light, with the brilliant sun, he can distinguish the flying birds above, and below he can see an autumn hair, for the vision of the eye is dependent on the power of the sun. When the highest condition of power (shi) is reached, things are arranged without a multitude of officials and are made fitting by expounding the system. But nowadays, reliance is placed on a multitude of offices and a host of civil servants, and in the official bureaux assistants and controllers are appointed. Now, the idea of appointing these assistants and controllers is indeed to prevent men from making profit, but these assistants and controllers themselves also desire to make profit. How then can they prevent others from doing so! Therefore, if one relies on assistants and controllers for one's administration, then will it be an administration that can barely maintain itself. It is not thus, if one understands "system"; one separates their power (shi) and puts checks on their conduct. Therefore is it said: 'If the conditions of power (shi) are such that it is difficult to conceal anything, then even a man like Zhi does no wrong. Therefore, the early kings prized power (shi). |
| | 禁使: |
或曰：「人主執虛後以應，則物應稽驗，稽驗則姦得。」臣以為不然。夫吏專制決事於千里之外，十二月而計書以定，事以一歲別計，而主以一聽，見所疑焉，不可蔽，員不足。夫物至，則目不得不見；言薄，則耳不得不聞。故物至則辨，言至則論。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
Some say: 'A ruler of men holds a nominal right of consent, post factum; then things are controlled and examined, and by this control wickedness is discovered.' I do not think that this is right. For officials exert sole authority and take decisions a thousand li away (from the ruler). In the twelfth month, to confirm it, they make a report, in which the affairs of the whole year have separate entries; but as the ruler gives but one hearing, although he sees doubtful cases, he cannot determine whether an official is capable or otherwise.... For example, if objects come near, the eye cannot but see them; if words are insistent, the ear cannot but hear them; for if objects approach, they alter in appearance, and if words draw near, they form coherent speech. |
| | 禁使: |
故治國之制，民不得避罪，如目不能以所見遁心。今亂國不然，恃多官眾吏。吏雖眾，事同體一也。夫事同體一者，相監不可。且夫利異而害不同者，先王所以為保也。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
So with the organization in a well-governed state, people cannot escape punishment any more than the eyes can hide from the mind what they see. But in the disorderly states of the present time, it is not thus: reliance is placed on a multitude of offices and a host of civil servants, but however numerous the civil servants may be, their affairs are the same and they belong to one body. Now, those whose affairs are the same and who belong to one body, cannot control one another. But by making their interests different and their disadvantages dissimilar, the early kings created guarantees. |
| | 禁使: |
故至治，夫妻交友不能相為棄惡蓋非，而不害於親，民人不能相為隱。上與吏也，事合而利異者也。今夫騶虞，以相監不可，事合而利同者也。若使馬焉能言，則騶虞無所逃其惡矣，利異也。利合而惡同者，父不能以問子，君不能以問臣。吏之與吏，利合而惡同也。夫事合而利異者，先王之所以為端也。民之蔽主，而不害於蓋，賢者不能益，不肖者不能損。故遺賢去智，治之數也。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
Therefore, in a condition of complete good government, husband and wife and friends cannot abandon each other's evil, cover up wrong-doing and not cause harm to relatives; nor can the men from the people mutually conceal each other from their superiors and government servants. That is because, although their affairs are connected, their interests are different. But nowadays a Zou and a Yu cannot control each other, because their business is the same and their interests are also similar... Suppose that horses could speak, then a Zou and a Yu would have no chance of escaping what they find hateful; that is because their interests would be different. When interests are connected and what they hate is the same, then a father cannot reprimand his son, nor a prince his minister. The relation of government servants to other government servants is this, that their interests are connected and what they hate is the same. Now, the early kings made it a principle that those whose business was connected, should have different interests. Though the people may hide things from their ruler, there is no harm done in thus covering them up, nor can there be advantage in having virtuous men or harm in having worthless ones. The system, therefore, of good government is to neglect the virtuous and to abolish the wise. |
